Section 4-61dd

Citation: Section 4-61dd
Parent Document: Dept. of Public Health v. Estrada, 349 Conn. 223 (2024)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 2024-06-11
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10131752/dept-of-public-health-v-estrada/ ↗

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the proffered reasons’’); Texas Dept. of Community
         Affairs v. Burdine, supra, 253 (‘‘[t]he ultimate burden
         of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant inten-
         tionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at
         all times with the plaintiff’’). Accordingly, the referee
         improperly held the department to a higher standard
         than was required when she concluded that the depart-
         ment must submit evidence that was ‘‘sufficiently credi-
         ble to meet [the] burden of persuasion . . . .’’
         (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.)
            The interest served by addressing underlying miscon-
         duct is manifestly separate and distinct from that served
         by penalizing whistleblower activity, so it is imperative
         that the employee establish a causal connection between
         the adverse employment action and the whistleblowing
         activity itself. Estrada failed to do so. As the trial court
         concluded, ‘‘the record unmistakably points to the fact
         that Blaschinski and [the department] were not dissatis-
         fied that [Estrada] made the disclosure that a mistake
         had been made. Blaschinski and [the department] were
         instead dissatisfied that the mistake had been made in
         the first place. Thus, the negative employment actions
         were taken, not because [Estrada] made the disclosure,
         but because [Estrada] made and repeated the mistake.’’
         (Emphasis added; footnotes omitted.)
           Accordingly, we cannot conclude that there is sub-
         stantial evidence in the administrative record to support
         the conclusion that the adverse personnel actions were
         caused by the disclosure itself rather than Estrada’s
         underlying conduct.13 See generally Dolgner v. Alander,
            13
               The department also contends that, although an employee need only
         have a reasonable, good faith belief that a violation of state law occurred,
         Estrada lacked such a belief in this case. Given our conclusion in part III
         C of this opinion that Estrada failed to establish a causal connection, we
         need not decide whether a reasonable, good faith belief that there was a
         violation of state law is sufficient to afford an employee protection under
         § 4-61dd. Even if Estrada had such a reasonable, good faith belief, she failed
         to establish that the adverse personnel actions were taken as a result of
         her whistleblower disclosure. Similarly, we need not decide whether § 19a-
         200 requires acting directors of public health to have certain qualifications.
Page 48                  CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                      June 11, 2024

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