Section 4-61dd

Citation: Section 4-61dd
Parent Document: Dept. of Public Health v. Estrada, 349 Conn. 223 (2024)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 2024-06-11
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10131752/dept-of-public-health-v-estrada/ ↗

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employee to automatically satisfy his or her burden
under the first step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis
and to move to a modified second step pursuant to
which the employer immediately has the burden to
affirmatively disprove the employee’s claim, all without
the employee ever submitting any evidence of a retalia-
tory animus for the disclosure. See McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, supra, 411 U.S. 802–805 (employee bears
initial burden to make prima facie case of discrimina-
tion, employer then must produce evidence of legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reason for adverse personnel
action, and burden then shifts back to employee to
show that employer’s proffered reason is pretextual);
see also, e.g., Ford v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Con-
necticut, Inc., supra, 216 Conn. 53–54 (adopting well
established employment discrimination burden shifting
analysis of McDonnell Douglas for use in discrimination
or wrongful discharge cases brought under General
Statutes § 31-290a, which is provision designed to pro-
tect employees who file for workers’ compensation
benefits).10
10
Under the Ford analysis, ‘‘[t]he plaintiff bears the initial burden of
proving by the preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimi-
nation. . . . In order to meet this burden, the plaintiff must present evi-
dence that gives rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. . . . If
the plaintiff meets this initial burden, the burden then shifts to the defendant
to rebut the presumption of discrimination by producing evidence of a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. . . . If the defendant
carries this burden of production, the presumption raised by the prima
facie case is rebutted, and the factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of
specificity.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Ford v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Connecticut, Inc., supra, 216
Conn. 53–54.
We note that the Appellate Court has approved of the use of the McDonnell
Douglas framework in the context of retaliatory discharge claims, brought
pursuant to General Statutes § 31-226a, for retaliation against employees
assisting former employees with the filing of claims for unemployment
compensation; see Beizer v. Dept. of Labor, 56 Conn. App. 347, 354–56, 742
A.2d 821, cert. denied, 252 Conn. 937, 747 A.2d 1 (2000); in the context of
retaliatory discharge claims, brought pursuant to § 31-290a, for the discharge
of employees after they file for workers’ compensation benefits; see Otero
v. Housing Authority, 86 Conn. App. 103, 104–105, 108–109, 860 A.2d 285
Page 44 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL June 11, 2024

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