Section 4-61dd

Citation: Section 4-61dd
Parent Document: Dept. of Public Health v. Estrada, 349 Conn. 223 (2024)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 2024-06-11
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10131752/dept-of-public-health-v-estrada/ ↗

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may be submitted through the grievance process that
         would trigger the alternative remedies scheme, the right
         provided for by § 4-61dd (e) (2) (A) is a right not to be
         retaliated against for disclosing certain whistleblower
         information. Cf. Southern New England Telephone Co.
         v. Cashman, 283 Conn. 644, 652, 931 A.2d 142 (2007)
         (‘‘[i]n determining the meaning of a statute . . . [the
         court] look[s] not only at the provision at issue, but
         also to the broader statutory scheme to ensure the
         coherency of [its] construction’’ (internal quotation
         marks omitted)). Put differently, the ‘‘claim’’ subject to
         the alternative scheme delineated in § 4-61dd (e) (3) is
         a claim for whistleblower retaliation—the same type
         of claim, with an alternative remedy, may be pursued
         under § 4-61dd (e) (2) (A).
            It is important to note that human rights referees do
         not adjudicate collective bargaining agreements, and
         grievances do not address whistleblower retaliation
         claims unless specifically provided for in the employee’s
         collective bargaining agreement. The department con-
         cedes that, ‘‘when employees challenge a personnel
         action through the grievance process in § 4-61dd (e) (3),
         they do not technically bring a statutory whistleblower
         retaliation claim.’’ An interpretation that an employee’s
         filing of a grievance on a ground other than whis-
         tleblower retaliation under § 4-61dd (e) (3) precludes
         the employee’s filing of a complaint of whistleblower
         retaliation under § 4-61dd (e) (2) (A) would force an
         employee to choose between vindicating his or her
         rights under the collective bargaining agreement or his
         or her rights under the whistleblower statute, even
         though the grievance was based on a ground other than
         retaliation. Such an interpretation would, at a minimum,
         be counterintuitive for a remedial statute, and we will
         not find such an intention by implication. Cf. Meriden
         v. Freedom of Information Commission, 338 Conn.
         310, 328, 258 A.3d 1 (2021) (‘‘we construe statutes to
Page 22                   CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                       June 11, 2024

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