Skip to main content
DRAFT FOR ATTORNEY REVIEW — NOT FINAL

Section 4-61dd

Citation
Section 4-61dd
Parent Document
Dept. of Public Health v. Estrada, 349 Conn. 223 (2024)
Jurisdiction
Connecticut (state)
Effective Date
2024-06-11

Other Sections in This Document (239)

Full Text

3,087 chars
In the present case, we conclude that Estrada’s dis-
         closure falls within the protection of § 4-61dd (a) and
         its broad definition of ‘‘any matter involving . . . viola-
         tion of state laws . . . mismanagement . . . or danger
         to the public safety,’’ despite her involvement in the
         actions giving rise to the disclosure. Her disclosure
         exposed the fact that the department had approved an
         acting director of health arguably in violation of § 19a-
         200 because the acting director did not have the mas-
         ter’s degree he claimed to have on his resume. The
         disclosure also brought to light the deficient review
         process that led to the error of approving Wang. Specifi-
         cally, the disclosure reported that the department had
         no policy to guide the review of credentials for prospec-
         tive acting directors. Blaschinski testified that ‘‘she did
         not have personal knowledge of the customary proce-
         dure or whether there was even a policy in place about
         reviewing credential[s].’’ Following Estrada’s disclo-
         sure, the department implemented a policy for reviewing
         credentials for acting directors. The policy ‘‘does not
         require the [department] to undertake independent veri-
         fication of the appointed individual’s credentials;
         of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287, 97 S. Ct. 568, 50 L. Ed. 2d 471
         (1977) (first to set forth dual motive discharge test). In cases in which the
         employee has proven that the employer had an illegal motive to discharge
         the employee, the burden of proof fairly rests with the employer because
         ‘‘[t]he employer is a wrongdoer; [the employer] has acted out of a motive
         that is declared illegitimate by the statute. It is fair that [the employer] bear
         the risk that the influence of legal and illegal motives cannot be separated
         . . . because the risk was created . . . by [the employer’s] own wrongdo-
         ing.’’ National Labor Relations Board v. Transportation Management Corp.,
         462 U.S. 393, 403, 103 S. Ct. 2469, 76 L. Ed. 2d 667 (1983), overruled in part
         on other grounds by Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs,
         Dept. of Labor v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 114 S. Ct. 2251, 129
         L. Ed. 2d 221 (1994). Once the employer satisfies its burden, either of
         persuasion or production, the rebuttable presumption that the employee
         was discharged for impermissible factors is dissolved. See, e.g., Loyd v.
         Phillips Bros., Inc., 25 F.3d 518, 522 (7th Cir. 1994). The employee is then
         required to prove that the employer’s proffered reason for the termination
         of employment is a mere pretext for an unlawful discharge. See, e.g., Fisher
         v. Transco Services-Milwaukee, Inc., 979 F.2d 1239, 1243 (7th Cir. 1992).
Page 40                   CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                       June 11, 2024