Section 4-61dd

Citation: Section 4-61dd
Parent Document: Dept. of Public Health v. Estrada, 349 Conn. 223 (2024)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 2024-06-11
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10131752/dept-of-public-health-v-estrada/ ↗

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may be submitted through the grievance process that
          would trigger the alternative remedies scheme, the right
          provided for by § 4-61dd (e) (2) (A) is a right not to be
          retaliated against for disclosing certain whistleblower
          information. Cf. Southern New England Telephone Co.
          v. Cashman, 283 Conn. 644, 652, 931 A.2d 142 (2007)
          (‘‘[i]n determining the meaning of a statute . . . [the
          court] look[s] not only at the provision at issue, but
          also to the broader statutory scheme to ensure the
          coherency of [its] construction’’ (internal quotation
          marks omitted)). Put differently, the ‘‘claim’’ subject to
          the alternative scheme delineated in § 4-61dd (e) (3) is
          a claim for whistleblower retaliation—the same type
          of claim, with an alternative remedy, may be pursued
          under § 4-61dd (e) (2) (A).
             It is important to note that human rights referees do
          not adjudicate collective bargaining agreements, and
          grievances do not address whistleblower retaliation
          claims unless specifically provided for in the employee’s
          collective bargaining agreement. The department con-
          cedes that, ‘‘when employees challenge a personnel
          action through the grievance process in § 4-61dd (e) (3),
          they do not technically bring a statutory whistleblower
          retaliation claim.’’ An interpretation that an employee’s
          filing of a grievance on a ground other than whis-
          tleblower retaliation under § 4-61dd (e) (3) precludes
          the employee’s filing of a complaint of whistleblower
          retaliation under § 4-61dd (e) (2) (A) would force an
          employee to choose between vindicating his or her
          rights under the collective bargaining agreement or his
          or her rights under the whistleblower statute, even
          though the grievance was based on a ground other than
          retaliation. Such an interpretation would, at a minimum,
          be counterintuitive for a remedial statute, and we will
          not find such an intention by implication. Cf. Meriden
          v. Freedom of Information Commission, 338 Conn.
          310, 328, 258 A.3d 1 (2021) (‘‘we construe statutes to
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