Section 4-61dd

Citation: Section 4-61dd
Parent Document: Dept. of Public Health v. Estrada, 349 Conn. 223 (2024)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 2024-06-11
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10131752/dept-of-public-health-v-estrada/ ↗

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2d 207 (1981) (when burden shifts, defendant ‘‘need not
          persuade the court that it was actually motivated by
          the proffered reasons’’); Texas Dept. of Community
          Affairs v. Burdine, supra, 253 (‘‘[t]he ultimate burden
          of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant inten-
          tionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at
          all times with the plaintiff’’). Accordingly, the referee
          improperly held the department to a higher standard
          than was required when she concluded that the depart-
          ment must submit evidence that was ‘‘sufficiently credi-
          ble to meet [the] burden of persuasion . . . .’’
          (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.)
             The interest served by addressing underlying miscon-
          duct is manifestly separate and distinct from that served
          by penalizing whistleblower activity, so it is imperative
          that the employee establish a causal connection between
          the adverse employment action and the whistleblowing
          activity itself. Estrada failed to do so. As the trial court
          concluded, ‘‘the record unmistakably points to the fact
          that Blaschinski and [the department] were not dissatis-
          fied that [Estrada] made the disclosure that a mistake
          had been made. Blaschinski and [the department] were
          instead dissatisfied that the mistake had been made in
          the first place. Thus, the negative employment actions
          were taken, not because [Estrada] made the disclosure,
          but because [Estrada] made and repeated the mistake.’’
          (Emphasis added; footnotes omitted.)
            Accordingly, we cannot conclude that there is sub-
          stantial evidence in the administrative record to support
          the conclusion that the adverse personnel actions were
          caused by the disclosure itself rather than Estrada’s
          underlying conduct.13 See generally Dolgner v. Alander,
            13
               The department also contends that, although an employee need only
          have a reasonable, good faith belief that a violation of state law occurred,
          Estrada lacked such a belief in this case. Given our conclusion in part III
          C of this opinion that Estrada failed to establish a causal connection, we
          need not decide whether a reasonable, good faith belief that there was a
          violation of state law is sufficient to afford an employee protection under
          § 4-61dd. Even if Estrada had such a reasonable, good faith belief, she failed
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