Eagen v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 42 A.3d 478 (2012)

Citation: Eagen v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 42 A.3d 478 (2012)
Parent Document: Eagen v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 42 A.3d 478 (2012)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 2012-05-22
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2297138/eagen-v-commission-on-human-rig... ↗

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During closing argument before the office of public hearings, the plaintiff argued that Schwartz “ha[d] to make out a prima facie case and the burden there is de minimis . . . .’’He argued that in order to establish a prima facie case of whistle-blower retaliation in this case, Schwartz had to satisfy three prongs: (1) “that he is a [whistle-blower], [who] was engaged in protected activity .... [W]e have conceded that . . . that prong is met,” (2) “that he was subjected to an adverse employment or adverse personnel action,” and (3) that “there [is] a causal connection between that adverse personnel action and the . . . protected] activity.” The plaintiff also argued that “the case law says that mere speculative or hypothetical possibilities are not material adverse personnel actions.” Additionally, the plaintiff argued that “the second and third prongs of the prima facie case [were not met], but also we . . . believe that the [plaintiff] has put forth a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the actions that were taken.” After final argument by the parties, the referee considered Schwartz’ § 4-6 ldd claims in a manner consistent with the prior decisions of the office of public hearings, using the burden shifting framework established under McDonnell Douglas Corp.

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