rejected, the question of whether RCW 49.60.210(1) prohibits retaliatory
discrimination in hiring. We therefore must apply the language ofthe statute,
rather than the language of distinguishable cases. The language of the statute
simply does not include the limitations that ESD 171 argues we should read into it.
17
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
Jin Zhu V. ESD 171, No. 94209-9
In support of its interpretation, BSD 171 relies on Warnek v. ABB
Combustion Engineering Services, Inc., which held that RCW 51.48.025 does not
create a cause of action for former employees who claim that their former
employer refused to rehire them in retaliation for the employees' having previously
filed workers' compensation claims in another state. 137 Wn.2d 450,972 P.2d 453
(1999). In addition to the clear factual differences from this case, there are key
differences in the relevant statutory provisions, and "[a] close comparison ofthe
language of RCW 51.48.025 and RCW 49.60.210 . . . shows that the latter
condemns retaliation even more forcefully." Allison, 118 Wn.2d at 96.
RCW 51.48.025(2) specifically provides that an "employee" may file a
claim against his or her "employer," while RCW 49.60.210(1) provides that
retaliation against "any person" is an unfair practice, and RCW 49.60.030(2)
provides a cause of action for "[a]ny person" who has been subjected to an unfair
practice. And as Warnek itself noted, Title 51 RCW does not contain any
provision similar to WLAD's statutory mandate for liberal construction. 137
Wn.2d at 461. Because Warnek interpreted materially different statutes and its
conclusions were based on "the limited facts" presented, we do not extend its
holding to the situation presented here. Id.