§ 46a-58

Citation: § 46a-58
Parent Document: Connecticut Judicial Branch v. Gilbert, 343 Conn. 90 (2022)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 2022-04-26
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/6462677/connecticut-judicial-branch-v-gilbert/ ↗

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If, in fact, the branch sought to retaliate against the
complainant or to resolve the pattern of harassment and
abuse by transferring her to a less convenient location
while allowing her abuser to remain in Danielson, then
the trial court’s second rationale for vacating the injunc-
tion also falls by the wayside. If retaliatory animus moti-
vated the decision, it is irrelevant that, under ordinary
circumstances, the branch, as the employer, has the
discretion to assign judicial marshals to the workplace
of its choosing, and that the employee cannot refuse
such a transfer or insist on being reassigned to a former
workplace.41 Connecticut, like other jurisdictions, has
articulated a clear public policy against punishing vic-
tims of sexual harassment and assault by involuntarily
transferring the victim, rather than the perpetrator,
either to resolve the situation or as retaliation for
reporting.42 When such an improper transfer has occurred,
41
The branch misses the point when it observes that judicial marshals
are not afforded ‘‘the privilege of selecting [their] preferred work location.’’
The injunction does not give the complainant the option to select any court-
house or her preferred courthouse. The injunction requires merely that the
branch permit her to return to the specific courthouse to which the branch
itself had assigned her (evidently consistent with branch policy) for many
years prior to the act of retaliation. See Dean v. Civiletti, 670 F.2d 99,
101 and n.2 (8th Cir. 1982) (victim of discrimination would be entitled to
assignment to geographic station from which she had been wrongly excluded
but not to station of her choosing).
42
For example, § 46a-60 (8) provides in relevant part: ‘‘If an employer
takes immediate corrective action in response to an employee’s claim of
sexual harassment, such corrective action shall not modify the conditions
of employment of the employee making the claim of sexual harassment
unless such employee agrees, in writing, to any modification in the conditions
of employment. ‘Corrective action’ taken by an employer, includes, but is
not limited to, employee relocation . . . .’’ Subdivision 4 of § 46a-60 further
provides in relevant part that it shall be a discriminatory practice ‘‘[f]or any
. . . employer . . . to discharge, expel or otherwise discriminate against
any person because such person has opposed any discriminatory employ-
ment practice or because such person has filed a complaint or testified or
assisted in any proceeding [regarding an alleged discriminatory employment
practice] . . . .’’ See generally Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway
Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 165 L. Ed. 2d 345 (2006) (construing
broadly antiretaliation provision of Title VII).
April 26, 2022 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 87

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