§ 46a-58

Citation: § 46a-58
Parent Document: Connecticut Judicial Branch v. Gilbert, 343 Conn. 90 (2022)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 2022-04-26
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/6462677/connecticut-judicial-branch-v-gilbert/ ↗

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complainant’s superiors did not transfer her out of any
          retaliatory intent.40 This conclusion is contrary to the
          referee’s factual findings. Although the referee did not
          use language containing an explicit finding that the
          complainant was transferred in retaliation for her com-
          plaint, the referee strongly implied that such was the
          case when she marshaled the relevant evidence of retali-
          ation and concluded that ‘‘it is unlikely that [the branch’s
          stated rationale] is the only or main reason for her
          transfer.’’ The referee’s factual findings leading to this
          statement and expressing disbelief in the branch’s prof-
          fered explanation—including Gaudette’s threats of
          reassignment expressly linked to the complainant’s
          ‘‘emotional behavior’’ and Downer’s explanation to the
          complainant that the reassignment was due to her ‘‘emo-
          tional’’ reaction to the Marco incidents—overwhelm-
          ingly point to a retaliatory animus. For all intents and
          purposes, these factual findings, read fairly, amount to
          a determination by the referee that the transfer was
          pretextual and retaliatory. See, e.g., Richardson v. Dept.
          of Correctional Service, 180 F.3d 426, 444 (2d Cir. 1999)
          (transfer and reassignment to less favorable work loca-
          tion following complaint of employment discrimination
          constitute prima facie evidence of retaliation). If we are
          correctly construing the referee’s findings in this respect,
          then the primary assumption underlying the trial court’s
          decision to vacate the injunction was incorrect. On
          remand, the referee will have the opportunity to clarify,
          in express terms, whether she finds that the transfer
          was most likely retaliatory and not merely an ordinary
          operational decision made on the basis of legitimate,
          nonretaliatory considerations.
            40
               Specifically, the trial court stated in its memorandum of decision that
          the injunction ‘‘unnecessarily and unreasonably impinges on the right of the
          [branch] to assign [the complainant] to a location where she is needed,
          absent, of course, any retaliatory intent.’’ (Emphasis added.) The court
          offered no support for its assumption that the transfer was not retaliatory
          and did not address the referee’s relevant findings to the contrary.
Page 86                         CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                               April 26, 2022

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