343 Conn. 90 APRIL, 2022 91
Connecticut Judicial Branch v. Gilbert
or protected by the Constitution or laws of this state or of the United
States, on account of . . . sex . . . .’’
Pursuant further to statute ((Supp. 2012) § 46a-86 (b)), ‘‘upon a finding of
a discriminatory employment practice, the [human rights referee] may
order the hiring or reinstatement of employees, with or without back
pay . . . .’’
Pursuant further to statute ((Supp. 2012) § 46a-86 (c)), ‘‘upon a finding of
a discriminatory practice prohibited by section 46a-58 . . . the [referee]
shall determine the damage suffered by the complainant . . . as a result
of such discriminatory practice and shall allow reasonable attorney’s
fees and costs.’’
The named defendant, G, who is employed as a judicial marshal by the
plaintiff, the Connecticut Judicial Branch, filed a complaint with the
defendant Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities in connec-
tion with her allegations that another judicial marshal, M, had subjected
her to severe and pervasive sexual harassment while they were stationed
together at a particular courthouse. Specifically, G alleged that the
branch discriminated against her on the basis of her gender by subjecting
her to a hostile work environment, failing to investigate her allegations
and to take remedial steps to protect her, and retaliating against her
for making her complaint by reassigning her to courthouses farther from
her residence. G claimed that the branch’s misconduct violated the
employment discrimination statute (§ 46a-60), as well as the general
antidiscrimination statute, § 46a-58 (a), and Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, as amended by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (42
U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.), as a predicate for G’s claim under § 46a-58 (a),
insofar as § 46a-58 (a) includes within its ambit ‘‘the deprivation of any
rights . . . secured or protected by the . . . laws . . . of the United
States . . . .’’ During the administrative proceedings before the commis-
sion, the branch issued a request for the production of all of G’s medical
records, but G produced nothing in response. The branch then objected
when G indicated that she intended to call her therapist and psychologist
as witnesses in support of her claim for emotional distress damages. In an
off-the-record ruling, the commission’s human rights referee apparently
ruled that, if G intended to pursue anything other than a garden-variety
emotional distress claim, she must provide copies of her medical records.
Because G had not produced all of her records at the time of the hearing
on her complaint, the referee ruled that she could introduce evidence
in support of her claim for garden-variety emotional distress but not
medical records or other treatment related evidence of emotional dis-
tress damages. After the hearing, the referee found that G’s claims were
substantiated. In connection with the violation of § 46a-60, the referee
awarded G back pay, as well as prejudgment and postjudgment interest
on the back pay, pursuant to § 46a-86 (b). In connection with the violation
of § 46a-58 (a), the referee awarded G attorney’s fees and $50,000 in
emotional distress damages pursuant to § 46a-86 (c). The referee also
Page 32 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL April 26, 2022