plainants who succeed in state administrative proceed-
ings pursuant to Title VII’’), aff’d, 447 U.S. 54, 100 S.
Ct. 2024, 64 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1980).16 We find the rationales
underlying these decisions to be persuasive.17
16
We note that there is limited, but conflicting, authority on the question
of whether state agencies may adjudicate a Title VII claim purely as a matter
of federal law. Compare Patzer v. Board of Regents, 763 F.2d 851, 857
and n.7 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that state agency lacks authority), with
Employment Security Commission v. Peace, 128 N.C. App. 1, 7–9, 493 S.E.2d
466 (1997) (holding that North Carolina State Personnel Commission had
authority to adjudicate merits of Title VII claim), aff’d in part and dismissed
in part, 349 N.C. 315, 507 S.E.2d 272 (1998). As we emphasized, that question
differs from the one we answer in the present case.
17
We also note that, since 2006, the commission has adjudicated numerous
claims of employment discrimination, jointly docketed with the EEOC, in
which the commission has purported to find violations of Title VII and to
award emotional distress damages for those violations under the auspices
of §§ 46a-58 (a) and 46a-86 (c). See, e.g., Commission on Human Rights &
Opportunities ex rel. Taranto v. Big Enough, Inc., Docket No. 0420316,
2006 WL 4753475, *11 (C.H.R.O. June 30, 2006). Various oversight procedures
governing the relationship between the EEOC and the commission, particu-
larly with respect to jointly docketed cases such as these, would have
provided opportunities for the EEOC to become aware of the commission’s
long-standing practice of making determinations whether a violation of Title
VII occurred and, in some cases, awarding damages for such violations
under state law. The EEOC has certified the commission as a designated
fair employment practices agency; 29 C.F.R. § 1601.80 (2020); which permits
the EEOC to accept the commission’s findings and resolutions of many
jointly filed cases without conducting an individual, case-by-case, substantial
weight review. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.75 (a) (2020). But see 29 C.F.R. §§1601.76
and 1601.77 (2020) (providing exceptions when review is undertaken). After
certification, the EEOC continues to monitor and evaluate the work of
designated fair employment practices agencies. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.78 (2020). In
addition, federal regulations require that, for cases processed under contract
with the EEOC, the EEOC ‘‘shall review charges closed by the certified [fair
employment practices] agency for lack of jurisdiction . . . .’’ 29 C.F.R.
§ 1601.77 (2020). The EEOC may revoke the certification of an agency that,
following such an evaluation, is deemed to no longer serve the interest of
effective enforcement of Title VII. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.79 (2020). In addition,
the work sharing agreement provides for the regular exchange of case
information between the two agencies. See United States Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, FY 2012 EEOC/FEPA Model Worksharing Agree-
ment: Worksharing Agreement Between State of Connecticut Commission
on Human Rights and Opportunities and the U.S. Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission New York District Office for Fiscal Year 2012, available
Page 56 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL April 26, 2022