of the statutory scheme. Id., 703. Second, the legislature
in effect overruled Truelove in 2019 by making eco-
nomic damages and attorney’s fees available to a party
who prevails on a state law claim of employment dis-
crimination under § 46a-60. See Public Acts 2019, No.
19-16, § 7. Accordingly, although principles of stare
decisis counsel against reconsidering Truelove at this
time, we will not now extend the reasoning of that
decision beyond its narrow confines.18 The legislative
scheme may not create the most elegant framework for
assigning different remedies to different discriminatory
practices on the basis of the jurisdictional source of
the injury, but the result we reach is dictated by the
sweeping language of §§ 46a-58 (a) and 46a-86 (c).19
18
We find no merit in the branch’s argument that, if we determine that
§ 46a-58 (a) is ambiguous, then, rather than consult extrinsic sources of
information, we must simply interpret it in the manner that exposes the
branch to the least potential liability because waivers of the state’s sovereign
immunity must be narrowly construed. As we explain more fully in part II
of this opinion, we agree that statutes by which the state purportedly waives
its sovereign immunity must be narrowly construed. But § 46a-58 (a) is not
a waiver of sovereign immunity; it is a general prohibition against discrimina-
tion by public and private parties alike. The branch has not offered and we
are not aware of any authority for the proposition that, when a statute of
general applicability is found to be ambiguous, it must be construed narrowly
so that, when the state happens to be the defendant, the state’s liability
will be limited. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court repeatedly has
instructed otherwise. See, e.g., Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 491,
128 S. Ct. 1931, 170 L. Ed. 2d 887 (2008) (‘‘[when] one statutory provision
unequivocally provides for a waiver of sovereign immunity to enforce a
separate statutory provision, that latter provision need not . . . be con-
strued in the manner appropriate to waivers of sovereign immunity’’ (internal
quotation marks omitted)); see also Richlin Security Service Co. v. Chertoff,
553 U.S. 571, 589, 128 S. Ct. 2007, 170 L. Ed. 2d 960 (2008) (‘‘The sovereign
immunity canon is just that—a canon of construction. It is a tool for interpre-
ting the law, and we have never held that it displaces the other traditional
tools of statutory construction.’’).
19
With respect to the question of whether the various statutes under the
commission’s jurisdiction collectively operate so as to preclude the award
of damages for violations of federal employment discrimination law, we
further note that the commission has been deciding Title VII claims in
partnership with the EEOC under § 46a-58 (a), and awarding damages for
violations under § 46a-86 (c), for many years. See, e.g., Shelton v. Collins,
April 26, 2022 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 59