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DRAFT FOR ATTORNEY REVIEW — NOT FINAL

§ 46a-58

Citation
§ 46a-58
Parent Document
Connecticut Judicial Branch v. Gilbert, 343 Conn. 90 (2022)
Jurisdiction
Connecticut (state)
Effective Date
2022-04-26

Other Sections in This Document (128)

Full Text

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Consistent with federal law, we conclude that the
          state has not waived its sovereign immunity with
          respect to prejudgment and postjudgment interest pay-
          able under § 46a-86 (a), either expressly or by necessary
          implication. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of
          the trial court in that regard and conclude that the
          commission’s award of interest must be vacated.
                                               III
                       EMOTIONAL DISTRESS DAMAGES
             Having held in part I of this opinion that the commis-
          sion is authorized to award emotional distress damages
          in this case, we now must address the first issue in the
          commission’s cross appeal, namely, whether the trial
          court correctly concluded that the complainant should
          have been precluded from recovering any emotional
          distress damages as a sanction for her refusal to pro-
          duce her full medical and psychotherapy records during
          discovery.24 We disagree with the trial court that the
          referee was required to disallow any evidence of ‘‘gar-
          den-variety’’ emotional distress.25 We do agree with the
          thus, the no-interest rule, were not at issue; see, e.g., Gares v. Willingboro,
          90 F.3d 720 (3d Cir. 1996); Paterson v. State, 128 Idaho 494, 915 P.2d 724
          (1996); Bain v. Springfield, 424 Mass. 758, 678 N.E.2d 155 (1997); or insofar
          as the issue of sovereign immunity was not before the court. See, e.g., Clarke
          v. Frank, 960 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir. 1992).
             24
                In addition to the substantive challenges discussed hereinafter, the com-
          mission raises other challenges to the trial court’s decision to vacate the
          emotional distress damages award, such as that the branch’s claim was
          inadequately briefed before the trial court and should have been deemed
          abandoned and that the information sought by the branch was privileged.
          We have reviewed those claims and find them unavailing.
             25
                We note that the referee relied on a recognized distinction in carving
          out a discrete subset of garden-variety emotional distress that can be proven
          solely on the basis of the complainant’s own and other lay testimony, without
          the need for expert medical evidence. In Patino v. Birken Mfg. Co., 304 Conn.
          679, 41 A.3d 1013 (2012), we recognized that such claims are cognizable
          under Connecticut law. See id., 707–708. Although no one involved in this
          litigation has offered a precise definition of the phrase ‘‘garden-variety emo-
          tional distress,’’ the term appears to have a commonly understood meaning,
          and, on appeal, the parties have not challenged the referee’s use of the term.
          For purposes of this case, we will use the phrase as the referee appeared
Page 68                        CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                              April 26, 2022