343 Conn. 90 APRIL, 2022 93
Connecticut Judicial Branch v. Gilbert
tions and, instead, found persuasive the rationales of those federal courts
that have considered the issue and concluded that, because § 46a-58 (a)
explicitly adopts federal antidiscrimination law as part of the substantive
conduct it regulates, when the commission finds a Title VII violation as
the factual predicate to a violation of § 46a-58 (a), it does so as a matter
of Connecticut law and, therefore, does not infringe on principles of
federal supremacy.
b. There was no merit to the branch’s claim that, even if federal law
does not bar the commission from awarding damages for Title VII viola-
tions under §§ 46a-58 (a) and 46a-86 (c), the commission is precluded
from doing so under state law, as construed by this court’s prior case
law: nothing in this court’s precedent holding that state employment
discrimination claims can be brought only under § 46a-60, the statute
specifically dedicated to such claims, and not under § 46a-58 (a), the
general antidiscrimination statute, indicated that the legislature intended
to preclude the commission from awarding a remedy authorized by § 46a-
86 (c) for a violation of § 46a-58 (a) predicated on a discriminatory
practice prohibited by federal law; moreover, in light of the sweeping
language of §§ 46a-58 (a) and 46a-86 (c), as well as a recent amendment
(P.A. 19-16, § 7) making economic damages and attorney’s fees available
to a party who prevails on a state law claim of employment discrimina-
tion, this court refrained from reconsidering or extending that precedent,
even though the legislative scheme may not create the most elegant
framework for assigning different remedies to different discriminatory
practices on the basis of the jurisdictional source of the injury.
2. The trial court incorrectly concluded that the state had waived its sover-
eign immunity with respect to the recovery of prejudgment and postjudg-
ment interest on awards under § 46a-86, and, accordingly, the referee’s
award of interest was vacated: this court followed the ‘‘no-interest rule,’’
as articulated by the federal courts and applied with equal force to the
state under Connecticut law, pursuant to which, in the absence of an
express waiver, the legislature is presumed not to have waived sovereign
immunity with respect to prejudgment and postjudgment interest, and
concluded that the state’s waiver of sovereign immunity as to liability
for civil rights violations under §§ 46a-58 (a) and 46a-60, and as to back
pay and damages under § 46a-86 (b) and (c), did not constitute a waiver
as to interest on such awards, as it was clear that the state has not
expressly waived its immunity with respect to interest on such back
pay and damages; moreover, the legislature did not waive sovereign
immunity by necessary implication because, insofar as interest is not
traditionally awarded as a part of damages, a statutory waiver of sover-
eign immunity only as to damages does not, by force of necessary
implication, waive the state’s immunity as to interest.
3. The trial court incorrectly concluded that the referee should have pre-
cluded G from recovering any emotional distress damages as a sanction
for her refusal to produce her full medical records, and, because the
Page 34 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL April 26, 2022