§ 46a-58

Citation: § 46a-58
Parent Document: Connecticut Judicial Branch v. Gilbert, 343 Conn. 90 (2022)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 2022-04-26
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/6462677/connecticut-judicial-branch-v-gilbert/ ↗

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that the term ‘‘ ‘[e]mployer’ includes the state and all
          political subdivisions thereof’’ for purposes of the Fair
          Employment Practices Act, the legislature also neces-
          sarily waived immunity as to interest. We conclude, to
          the contrary, that the award of interest is subject to
          special treatment for purposes of sovereign immunity,
          and we agree with the branch that the state’s waiver
          of sovereign immunity as to liability for civil rights
          violations under §§ 46a-58 (a) and 46a-60 and as to back
          pay and damages under § 46a-86 (b) and (c) does not
          constitute a waiver of immunity as to interest on
          such awards.
             ‘‘Sovereign immunity . . . presents a question of law
          over which we exercise de novo review. . . . The prin-
          ciple that the state cannot be sued without its consent,
          or sovereign immunity, is well established under our
          case law. . . . Exceptions to this doctrine are few and
          narrowly construed under our jurisprudence.’’ (Internal
          quotation marks omitted.) Columbia Air Services, Inc.
          v. Dept. of Transportation, 293 Conn. 342, 349, 977 A.2d
          636 (2009).
             The federal courts have long applied the so-called
          ‘‘no-interest rule,’’ pursuant to which, in the absence of
          an express legislative waiver, Congress is presumed
          not to have waived the federal government’s sovereign
          immunity with respect to prejudgment and postjudg-
          ment interest. Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S.
          310, 311, 106 S. Ct. 2957, 92 L. Ed. 2d 250 (1986). The
          United States Supreme Court traced the history of and
          rationale for this rule in Shaw: ‘‘This requirement of a
          separate waiver reflects the historical view that interest
          is an element of damages separate from damages on the
          substantive claim. . . . Because interest was generally
          presumed not to be within the contemplation of the
          parties, common-law courts in England allowed interest
          by way of damages only when founded [on] agreement
          of the parties. . . . In turn, the [agreement basis] of
April 26, 2022             CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                      Page 61

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