92 APRIL, 2022 343 Conn. 90
Connecticut Judicial Branch v. Gilbert
ordered that the branch ‘‘give [G] the option of returning to the . . .
courthouse’’ to which she assigned before she reported the harassment.
On appeal to the trial court, that court rejected the branch’s claims
that the commission was not authorized to award attorney’s fees and
emotional distress damages to victims of employment discrimination
under either § 46a-58 (a) or § 46a-60 and that the award of prejudgment
and postjudgment interest against the state under § 46a-86 (b) is barred
by the state’s sovereign immunity. Nonetheless, the trial court agreed
with the branch’s claim that the referee improperly awarded G emotional
distress damages in light of her failure to produce her medical records,
allegedly in violation of the referee’s discovery orders, and, accordingly,
vacated the award of emotional distress damages. The trial court also
vacated the injunction requiring the branch to allow G the option of
returning to the courthouse to which she previously had been assigned,
concluding that the injunction was an abuse of discretion and not prop-
erly tailored. From the judgment rendered thereon, the branch appealed
and the commission cross appealed. Held:
1. The branch could not prevail on its claim that the trial court incorrectly
had concluded that the commission was authorized to award emotional
distress damages and attorney’s fees in an employment discrimination
action under the general antidiscrimination statute, § 46a-58 (a), and
that statute’s civil remedies provision, § 46a-86 (c):
a. The commission did not exceed its authority under federal law by
adjudicating a Title VII claim, that is, by holding a formal hearing to
determine whether the branch had engaged in discriminatory practices
in violation of Title VII: the United States Supreme Court previously had
rejected the branch’s argument that the federal statute (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5 (f)) that allows for the bringing of a judicial action to enforce Title
VII authorizes only courts, and not administrative agencies, to formally
resolve Title VII claims, and that argument was unavailing particularly
in light of the fact that the commission does not purport to formally
adjudicate Title VII claims but merely identifies discriminatory practices
under Title VII for purposes of applying state law; moreover, the fact
that the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission itself lacks
the authority to formally adjudicate Title VII claims does not indicate
an intention to bar state agencies from identifying Title VII violations
for purposes of determining whether state law has been violated, as
there was a strong congressional preference, acknowledged by the United
States Supreme Court, pervasive in the legislative history of Title VII,
and reflected in Title VII’s work sharing scheme, for resolving matters
at the state level that involve the concurrent violation of Title VII and
state employment discrimination laws; furthermore, this court rejected
the branch’s argument that allowing a state fair employment practices
agency, such as the commission, to find and penalize Title VII violations
under state law would upset a carefully calibrated federal scheme that
balances the availability of remedies with important procedural protec-
April 26, 2022 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 33