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DRAFT FOR ATTORNEY REVIEW — NOT FINAL

§ 46a-58

Citation
§ 46a-58
Parent Document
Connecticut Judicial Branch v. Gilbert, 343 Conn. 90 (2022)
Jurisdiction
Connecticut (state)
Effective Date
2022-04-26

Other Sections in This Document (128)

Full Text

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The commission contends that the injunction was
          authorized, if not required, by the commission’s broad
          mandate to eliminate the effects of past discriminatory
          employment practices, to make victims whole, to bar
          like discrimination in the future, and to ensure that
          victims are not made to suffer further for the conduct
          of the sexual harasser. See, e.g., General Statutes § 46a-
          86 (b) (‘‘the presiding officer shall . . . issue an order
          to eliminate the discriminatory employment practice
          complained of and to make the complainant whole’’);
          Thames Talent, Ltd. v. Commission on Human Rights
          & Opportunities, supra, 265 Conn. 140 (describing ‘‘the
          central statutory purposes of eradicating discrimination
          . . . and making persons whole for injuries suffered
          through past discrimination’’ (internal quotation marks
          omitted)); Brittell v. Dept. of Correction, 247 Conn.
          148, 177, 717 A.2d 1254 (1998) (‘‘the victim of sexual
          harassment should not be punished for the conduct of
          the harasser . . . by hav[ing] to work in a less desirable
          location as a result of the employer’s remedial plan’’
          (citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted)).
          The commission further contends that, if the trial court
          determined that the injunction was overly broad or
          founded on an insufficiently developed record, the
          appropriate remedy was to remand the matter to the
          commission to order additional briefing, to hold a new
          hearing, and/or to craft a more narrowly tailored injunc-
          tion, rather than simply to vacate the injunction. We
          agree.
             The following procedural history is relevant to this
          issue. The complainant alleged in her complaint that
          the branch was retaliating against her for reporting
          an injunction will be moot only whe[n] there is no reasonable expectation
          that the conduct will recur, or whe[n] interim events have completely and
          irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation’’ (internal quotation
          marks omitted)), appeal dismissed, Docket No. 13-7124, 2014 WL 812812
          (D.C. Cir. January 21, 2014).
Page 82                   CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                         April 26, 2022