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DRAFT FOR ATTORNEY REVIEW — NOT FINAL

Section 46a-64c

Citation
Section 46a-64c
Parent Document
Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Sullivan Associates, 250 Conn. 763 (1999)
Jurisdiction
Connecticut (state)
Effective Date
1999-10-12

Other Sections in This Document (133)

Full Text

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In the present case, the defendant claims that it rejected Hanson and Roper as tenants on the basis of: (1) its minimum income policy; and (2) its objections to the provisions of section 8 leases. Even if the majority is correct that § 46a-64c does not permit a landlord to reject a prospective tenant on the basis of objections to the provisions of section 8 leases,2 under the disparate *803treatment mixed-motive analysis,3 the defendant may avoid liability for its actions by establishing that it would have rejected Hanson and Roper even if they had not been section 8 housing assistance recipients. Levy v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, supra, 236 Conn. 106; see also Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, supra, 490 U.S. 258; Mt. Healthy City Board of Education v. Doyle, supra, 429 U.S. 287. In the present case, it is undisputed that the defendant had a longstanding policy of rejecting all applicants whose gross *804weekly income was less one month’s rent. It is also undisputed that neither Hanson’s nor Roper’s income met the defendant’s minimum standard. Furthermore, the trial court concluded that there was no evidence whatsoever to suggest that the defendant’s reliance on its minimum income policy to justify its rejection of Hanson and Roper was pretextual. In my view, the evidence does not permit a conclusion that the defendant would not have made the same decisions if the applicants had not been section 8 housing assistance recipients. Because the evidence does not permit a conclusion that the defendant discriminated against Hanson and Roper because of the source of their income— as opposed to the amount of their income — I would conclude that the defendant’s actions were not violative of § 46a-64c. I therefore respectfully dissent.