Section 31-51q
- Citation
- Section 31-51q
- Parent Document
- Cotto v. United Technologies Corp., 251 Conn. 1 (1999)
- Jurisdiction
- Connecticut (state)
- Effective Date
- 1999-10-12
Other Sections in This Document (143)
- Cotto v. United Technologies Corp., 251 Conn. 1 (1999)
- Cotto v. United Technologies Corp., 251 Conn. 1 (1999)
- Cotto v. United Technologies Corp., 251 Conn. 1 (1999)
- Cotto v. United Technologies Corp., 251 Conn. 1 (1999)
- Cotto v. United Technologies Corp., 251 Conn. 1 (1999)
- Cotto v. United Technologies Corp., 251 Conn. 1 (1999)
- Cotto v. United Technologies Corp., 251 Conn. 1 (1999)
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Full Text
1,867 charsTo begin, however, I agree that there effectively is no difference between the two scenarios the majority postulates, both of which require the employee to keep a flag on his desk at work. Whether the employee is forced to put it there himself or endure its placement by another person is of little consequence. The right of freedom of thought protected by the first amendment includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all. See Board of Education v. Barnette, supra, 319 U.S. 633-34. Similarly, it is well established that “[a] system which secures the right to proselytize religious, political, and ideological causes must also guarantee the concomitant right to decline to foster such concepts. The right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are complementary components of the broader concept of individual freedom of mind. [Id., 637].” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 51, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 86 L. Ed. 2d 29 (1985). Although “the affirmative act of a flag salute involved a more serious infringement upon personal liberties than the passive act,of carrying the state motto on a license plate . . . the difference is *51essentially one of degree.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Consequently, in Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714-15, 97 S. Ct. 1428, 51 L. Ed. 2d 752 (1977), when faced with a state measure that forced an individual, as part of his daily life, to be an instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view that he found unacceptable by requiring noncommercial motor vehicles to bear license plates with the state motto, “Live Free or Die,” the court held that “the State [had] invade[d] the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official control.’ ”