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DRAFT FOR ATTORNEY REVIEW — NOT FINAL

Section 31-51q

Citation
Section 31-51q
Parent Document
Cotto v. United Technologies Corp., 251 Conn. 1 (1999)
Jurisdiction
Connecticut (state)
Effective Date
1999-10-12

Other Sections in This Document (143)

Full Text

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Whether § 31-51q applies to the events resulting in the discharge of the plaintiff by the defendant presents a question of statutory interpretation. “The process of statutory interpretation involves a reasoned search for the intention of the legislature. Frillici v. Westport, 231 Conn. 418, 431, 650 A.2d 557 (1994). In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of this case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply. In seeking to determine that meaning, we look to the words of the statute itself, to the *26legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter. . . . Id.; Carpenteri-Waddington, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 231 Conn. 355, 362, 650 A.2d 147 (1994); United Illuminating Co. v. Groppo, 220 Conn. 749, 755-56, 601 A.2d 1005 (1992).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) United Illuminating Co. v. New Haven, 240 Conn. 422, 431-32, 692 A.2d 742 (1997). Applying these principles, I conclude that the statute is intended to reach only speech or conduct of an employee that, based on its location or circumstance, is or would be protected against governmental, and not private, action.3 Concomitantly, however, the statute does not reach expressive activity, such as that alleged by the plaintiff, that takes place on a private employer’s property and involves only restrictive conduct by his private, nongovernmental employer, because those constitutional guarantees simply do not reach such activity.