Section 31-51q

Citation: Section 31-51q
Parent Document: Cotto v. United Technologies Corp., 251 Conn. 1 (1999)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 1999-10-12
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/7898264/cotto-v-united-technologies-corp/ ↗

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On the other hand, the court in Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568-75, 88 S. Ct. 1731, 20 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1968), held that a teacher, by virtue of his public employment, does not relinquish first amendment rights to comment on matters of public interest. “[Sjpeech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government. . . . Accordingly, the Court has frequently reaffirmed that speech on public issues occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values . . . .” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Connick v. Myers, supra, 461 U.S. 145. Whether an employee’s expression addresses a matter of public concern must be determined on a case-by-case basis, examining the content, form and context of the relevant conduct, within the framework of the entire record. Id., 147-48 (examining content, form and context of conduct); Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District, 439 U.S. 410, 415 n.4, 99 S. Ct. 693, 58 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1979) *44(different fact scenarios require different considerations). Although the first part of the inquiry — that is, which topics are considered to be of public concern— is within the province of the trial court to determine as a matter of law, the second part of the inquiry — that is, whether the employee’s expressions address such a topic — is within the province of the jury. Connick v. Myers, supra, 148 n.7; Daley v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 249 Conn. 766, 782, 734 A.2d 112 (1999). In order to make such a determination, the jury must, except in the most extreme circumstances, conduct a thorough fact-specific inquiry. See Connick v. Myers, supra, 147-48; Daley v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., supra, 782. Consequently, the resolution of the second part of the inquiry, the question of fact, is not generally attainable pursuant to a motion to strike.

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