Section 31-51q
- Citation
- Section 31-51q
- Parent Document
- Cotto v. United Technologies Corp., 251 Conn. 1 (1999)
- Jurisdiction
- Connecticut (state)
- Effective Date
- 1999-10-12
Other Sections in This Document (143)
- Cotto v. United Technologies Corp., 251 Conn. 1 (1999)
- Cotto v. United Technologies Corp., 251 Conn. 1 (1999)
- Cotto v. United Technologies Corp., 251 Conn. 1 (1999)
- Cotto v. United Technologies Corp., 251 Conn. 1 (1999)
- Cotto v. United Technologies Corp., 251 Conn. 1 (1999)
- Cotto v. United Technologies Corp., 251 Conn. 1 (1999)
- Cotto v. United Technologies Corp., 251 Conn. 1 (1999)
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Full Text
592 charsFurthermore, interpreting the statute to apply to private workplace conduct could — and, in the present case, does — bring two competing sets of expressive rights into conflict, and therefore places the state, in the form of the courts, on one side of that contest. Such a construction raises serious constitutional issues. It is well established that we construe statutes to avoid, rather than to confront, such issues. Castagno v. Wholean, 239 Conn. 336, 344, 684 A.2d 1181 (1996). The majority, however, places an interpretation on the statute that brings such a confrontation to the fore.