Section 31-51q

Citation: Section 31-51q
Parent Document: Cotto v. United Technologies Corp., 251 Conn. 1 (1999)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 1999-10-12
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/7898264/cotto-v-united-technologies-corp/ ↗

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It is instructive to compare the plaintiffs case with that which would have arisen if, hypothetically, he had arrived at his workstation to find that his supervisor had affixed a flag to every workstation including his own. Although the plaintiff might have felt aggrieved by finding the flag there, he would have been hard put to articulate a viable constitutional basis for his grievance. He could not have relied on Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633-34, 63 S. Ct. 1178, 87 L. Ed. 1628 (1943), because of the absence of any direction that he do or say anything related to his own political beliefs. He could not have relied on Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713, 97 S. Ct. 1428, 51 L. Ed. 2d 752 (1977), because his own property would not have been commandeered to convey to the public a political belief to which he did not subscribe. He could not have relied on Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 569-70, 115 S. Ct. 2338, 132 L. Ed. 2d 487 (1995), because he would not have been required to be identified or associated with his employer’s political message. In sum, the message of the flag reasonably could not have been attributed to him personally. Under such circumstances, even though the symbolism of the flag may often be a matter of public concern, a complaint based on having to see the flag at a workstation would not, in all probability, have stated a valid constitutional claim.

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