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Ky. Off. of the Att'y Gen., Complaint, Commonwealth v. RealPage, Inc. (filed July 2, 2025)

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Ky. Off. of the Att'y Gen., Complaint, Commonwealth v. RealPage, Inc. (filed July 2, 2025)
Jurisdiction
Kentucky (state)
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how prices change, compared to a situation in which each client sets prices independently. No

longer do competitors react in distinctive ways to changing market conditions as they would in a

market without access to competitors’ transactional data. Instead, AIRM price recommendations

tend to standardize those reactions. This leads to the second result: pricing recommendations,

and consequently pricing decisions, become more predictable and aligned among competitors as

each is using the same set of learned model parameters.

117. This dynamic exists not only in markets with growing demand, but also so-called

“down markets,” where demand is decreasing. In a competitive market with a fixed supply (at

least in the short run) of housing units, a demand decrease would result in prices falling. But

AIRM and YieldStar resist price decreases in down markets as much as possible while achieving

targeted occupancy rates. RealPage told one prospective AIRM client that the combination of

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“AI and the robust data in the RealPage ecosystem” would allow the landlord to “avoid the race

to the bottom in down markets.”

2. AIRM and YieldStar Impose Multiple Guardrails Intended to
Artificially Keep Prices High or Minimize Price Decreases

118. Unsatisfied with relying merely on competitively sensitive data to advantage

landlords, RealPage created “guardrails” within AIRM and YieldStar to force adjustments to the

price recommendation. But these guardrails serve as one-way ratchets that help landlords, not

renters, by increasing price recommendations or limiting a recommended decrease. And each of

these guardrails makes use of competitively sensitive data that landlords agree to share with