Deutsche Bank AG v. Vik, 349 Conn. 120 (2024)

Citation: Deutsche Bank AG v. Vik, 349 Conn. 120 (2024)
Parent Document: Deutsche Bank AG v. Vik, 349 Conn. 120 (2024)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 2024-05-28
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10131755/deutsche-bank-ag-v-vik/ ↗

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not parties to or involved in the underlying declaratory
       judgment action; (2) the claims were solely premised
       on conduct, not communications; and (3) the alleged
       fraud did not occur during the pendency of a judicial
       proceeding between [the] parties.’’ (Citations omitted.)
       Dorfman v. Smith, supra, 342 Conn. 604 n.10.
         In Dorfman, we emphasized the importance of the
       third factor, which reflects the litigation privilege’s fun-
       damental purpose of preventing retaliatory civil claims
       against a party opponent based on statements made by
       them in a judicial proceeding between the parties. Id.
       We then distinguished the complaint in Dorfman,
       which, unlike the complaint in Fiondella, clearly alleged
       dishonesty on the part of a party opponent based
       entirely on allegedly false statements made in an action
       between the parties, not on any type of conduct.9 Id.,
       604–605.
          In the present case, in contrast, the plaintiff was not
       a party to Caroline’s actions, and its claims are not
       premised on any statement made in those actions but,
       rather, are premised on conduct (the alleged multifac-
       eted conspiracy) occurring outside of the actions. Like-
       wise, the alleged fraud did not commence during the
       actions but, rather, began months earlier with the
       alleged forgery of the ROFR. In essence, as alleged in
       the complaint, the actions were the defendants’ attempt
       to defraud ABG by other means when their first
       attempt failed.
         9
          Although, in Dorfman, the parties were opponents in the prior action
       that formed the basis of the dispute, the litigation privilege nonetheless may
       insulate a person from liability for statements made in a prior judicial
       proceeding irrespective of whether the party bringing the action was a
       participant in the prior proceeding. See, e.g., Simms v. Seaman, supra, 308
       Conn. 537 (‘‘communications uttered or published in the course of judicial
       proceedings are absolutely privileged so long as they are in some way
       pertinent to the subject of the controversy’’ (internal quotation marks
       omitted)).
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