Deutsche Bank AG v. Vik, 349 Conn. 120 (2024)

Citation: Deutsche Bank AG v. Vik, 349 Conn. 120 (2024)
Parent Document: Deutsche Bank AG v. Vik, 349 Conn. 120 (2024)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 2024-05-28
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10131755/deutsche-bank-ag-v-vik/ ↗

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omitted.) MacDermid, Inc. v. Leonetti, 310 Conn. 616,
         626, 79 A.3d 60 (2013). Whether the litigation privilege
         applies in a given case is a question of law subject to
         de novo review. See, e.g., Dorfman v. Smith, supra,
         594. When deciding whether the privilege applies, every
         presumption in favor of the court’s jurisdiction should
         be indulged. See, e.g., Priore v. Haig, 344 Conn. 636,
         645, 280 A.3d 402 (2022).
            The litigation privilege is ‘‘a long-standing [common-
         law] rule that communications uttered or published
         in the course of judicial proceedings are absolutely
         privileged so long as they are in some way pertinent
         to the subject of the controversy.’’ (Internal quotation
         marks omitted.) Simms v. Seaman, 308 Conn. 523, 537,
         69 A.3d 880 (2013). ‘‘The privilege . . . applies to every
         step of the proceeding until [its] final disposition . . .
         including to statements made in pleadings or other doc-
         uments prepared in connection with [the] proceeding.’’
         (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
         Scholz v. Epstein, 341 Conn. 1, 28–29, 266 A.3d 127
         (2021). The privilege ‘‘originated in response to the need
         to bar persons accused of crimes from suing their accus-
         ers for defamation. . . . [It] then developed to encom-
         pass and bar defamation claims against all participants
         in judicial proceedings, including judges, attorneys, par-
         ties, and witnesses.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quota-
         tion marks omitted.) MacDermid, Inc. v. Leonetti,
         supra, 310 Conn. 627. Subsequently, the privilege was
         expanded to bar a variety of retaliatory civil claims
         arising from communications or communicative acts
         occurring in the course of a judicial or quasi-judicial
         proceeding, including, but not limited to, claims for
         tortious interference, intentional infliction of emotional
         distress, fraud, and violations of CUTPA. See Dorfman
         v. Smith, supra, 342 Conn. 592, 616.
            ‘‘The policy underlying the [litigation] privilege is that
         in certain situations the public interest in having people
Page 20                   CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                  May 28, 2024

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