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DRAFT FOR ATTORNEY REVIEW — NOT FINAL

Deutsche Bank AG v. Vik, 349 Conn. 120 (2024)

Citation
Deutsche Bank AG v. Vik, 349 Conn. 120 (2024)
Parent Document
Deutsche Bank AG v. Vik, 349 Conn. 120 (2024)
Jurisdiction
Connecticut (state)
Effective Date
2024-05-28

Other Sections in This Document (136)

Full Text

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claims were predicated entirely on statements made
          in the course of a judicial proceeding such that our
          application of the privilege disposed of the claims in
          their entirety. See, e.g., Dorfman v. Smith, supra, 342
          Conn. 604–605 (claims were based solely on false state-
          ments in pleadings and other court documents); Scholz
          v. Epstein, supra, 341 Conn. 4 (‘‘all of the defendant’s
          alleged conduct occurred within the scope of the under-
          lying foreclosure proceeding’’); Simms v. Seaman,
          supra, 308 Conn. 528–29 (claims were based solely on
          statements and conduct occurring during judicial pro-
          ceeding); Rioux v. Barry, supra, 283 Conn. 343 (claims
          were based solely on false statements made during
          quasi-judicial proceeding). Here, application of the priv-
          ilege would yield no such result.
             We agree with the plaintiff that the present case
          resembles Fiondella v. Meriden, supra, 186 Conn. App.
          552, far more than it does any case in which the litigation
          privilege has been applied to bar a cause of action. As
          we observed about Fiondella in Dorfman: ‘‘In Fion-
          della, the defendants successfully brought an action
          seeking a declaratory judgment that they were the legal
          owners of a portion of land by operation of the doctrine
          of adverse possession. . . . The plaintiffs . . . who
          were not parties in the underlying declaratory judgment
          action, subsequently brought claims of fraud, slander
          of title, and civil conspiracy against the defendants,
          alleging that the defendants [had] intentionally con-
          cealed the declaratory judgment action from them, con-
          trary to their property rights and interests. . . . The
          defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of
          absolute privilege, which the trial court granted. . . .
          The Appellate Court reversed the trial court’s judgment,
          holding that absolute immunity did not apply to bar the
          plaintiffs’ claims. In so holding, the Appellate Court
          relied on the following facts: (1) the plaintiffs were
          not parties to or involved in the underlying declaratory
May 28, 2024                  CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                                     Page 29