Deutsche Bank AG v. Vik, 349 Conn. 120 (2024)

Citation: Deutsche Bank AG v. Vik, 349 Conn. 120 (2024)
Parent Document: Deutsche Bank AG v. Vik, 349 Conn. 120 (2024)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 2024-05-28
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10131755/deutsche-bank-ag-v-vik/ ↗

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does not appear from the complaint that the defendants
were parties to those proceedings or otherwise partici-
pated in them in such a capacity as to warrant applica-
tion of the privilege. The complaint alleges, rather, that
‘‘[Erik] filed various legal challenges . . . to the
enforcement proceedings in Norway. While [these] tac-
tics were meritless, they succeeded in dragging out the
sales process over the course of several years. . . .
On information and belief, this conduct has all been
undertaken at the direction of and in coordination with
Alexander . . . .’’7 Erik is not a defendant in this case,
but, even if he were, and even if Alexander directed
him to mount the aforementioned legal challenges,
unless the defendants participated in those proceedings
as parties or witnesses, the privilege does not attach
to them. See, e.g., Khan v. Yale University, 347 Conn.
1, 19, 295 A.3d 855 (2023) (‘‘doctrine of absolute . . .
immunity . . . shields judges, parties, and witnesses
from liability for their testimony in judicial and quasi-
judicial proceedings’’); see also Wise v. Thrifty Payless,
Inc., 83 Cal. App. 4th 1296, 1304, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 437
(2000) (‘‘Nonparticipants and nonlitigants to judicial
proceedings are never protected from liability under
[the litigation privilege]. . . . Shorn of its adornments,
[the defendant’s] argument is in reality a plea for refuge
from the consequences of its own tortious conduct
under the blanket of a privilege enjoyed by a third
party.’’ (Citations omitted.)); 74 Am. Jur. 2d 750, Torts
§ 74 (2023) (‘‘[t]hat one joint tortfeasor is protected
against liability by a personal privilege does not affect
by SHI, in 2016 and 2017, related to the Oslo Enforcement Court’s recognition
of the English judgment. As with the litigation involving Erik, however, it
does not appear from the complaint, which we must construe in the light
most favorable to the pleader and to sustaining the court’s jurisdiction, that
the defendants participated in either of those appeals. The complaint alleges,
rather, that Alexander had divested himself of SHI prior to the appeals.
7
The defendants’ memorandum of law in support of their motion to dis-
miss also states that Alexander was not a party to Erik’s legal challenges
in Norway.
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