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DRAFT FOR ATTORNEY REVIEW — NOT FINAL

Deutsche Bank AG v. Vik, 349 Conn. 120 (2024)

Citation
Deutsche Bank AG v. Vik, 349 Conn. 120 (2024)
Parent Document
Deutsche Bank AG v. Vik, 349 Conn. 120 (2024)
Jurisdiction
Connecticut (state)
Effective Date
2024-05-28

Other Sections in This Document (136)

Full Text

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‘‘restraints built into [them] by virtue of [their] stringent
         requirements.’’ Rioux v. Barry, 283 Conn. 338, 347–48,
         927 A.2d 304 (2007); see also Scholz v. Epstein, supra,
         341 Conn. 21 (‘‘[t]he plaintiff’s statutory theft claim . . .
         is distinguishable from a vexatious litigation claim
         because the elements of the claim do not provide any
         safeguards to prevent inappropriate retaliatory liti-
         gation’’).
            In Simms v. Seaman, supra, 308 Conn. 523, we identi-
         fied the following factors that courts should consider
         when determining whether a claim is barred by the
         litigation privilege: ‘‘(1) whether the alleged conduct
         subverts the underlying purpose of a judicial proceed-
         ing, in a similar way to how conduct constituting abuse
         of process and vexatious litigation does; (2) whether
         the alleged conduct is similar in essential respects to
         defamatory statements, inasmuch as a defamation
         action is barred by the privilege; and (3) whether the
         alleged conduct may be adequately addressed by other
         available remedies.’’ Scholz v. Epstein, supra, 341 Conn.
         10–11; see Simms v. Seaman, supra, 308 Conn. 545–46.
         ‘‘Since . . . Simms, this court has clarified that these
         factors . . . are simply instructive, with the focus
         being on the issues relevant to the competing interests
         in each case in light of the particular context of the
         case. . . . We are not required to rely exclusively or
         entirely on these factors; rather, they are useful when
         undertaking a careful balancing of all competing public
         policies implicated by the specific claim at issue and
         determining whether affording [parties] this common-
         law immunity from this common-law action is war-
         ranted.’’ (Citation omitted; footnote omitted; internal
         quotation marks omitted.) Scholz v. Epstein, supra,
         11–12.
           Mindful of the foregoing principles and construing
         the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
         we conclude that the Appellate Court erred in determin-
Page 22                         CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                               May 28, 2024