Deutsche Bank AG v. Vik, 349 Conn. 120 (2024)

Citation: Deutsche Bank AG v. Vik, 349 Conn. 120 (2024)
Parent Document: Deutsche Bank AG v. Vik, 349 Conn. 120 (2024)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 2024-05-28
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10131755/deutsche-bank-ag-v-vik/ ↗

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ROFR. Suffice it to say that the litigation privilege pro-
          vides no refuge for persons who engage in this type
          of extrajudicial misconduct. See, e.g., 4 Restatement
          (Second), supra, § 880, comment (a), p. 326 (‘‘one who
          pays a witness to make a defamatory or otherwise harm-
          ful and untruthful remark [on] the witness stand is liable
          for the harm resulting to a third person although the
          witness himself . . . is immune from liability’’).
             Whether Caroline can claim immunity with respect
          to her actions is a closer question. Filing an action
          is a quintessentially communicative act to which the
          litigation privilege ordinarily would apply if it were the
          sole basis for the plaintiff’s complaint and the plaintiff
          was not claiming abuse of process or vexatious litiga-
          tion. See Dorfman v. Smith, supra, 342 Conn. 597 (‘‘even
          if the allegations in the complaint are sufficient to sup-
          port a claim for vexatious litigation or abuse of process
          but such claims are not raised, these allegations do not
          remove immunity from a claim that falls within the
          scope of the litigation privilege’’). The plaintiff con-
          tends, however, that the factors this court identified in
          Simms for determining whether the privilege should
          apply in a particular case militate against its application
          in the present case because (1) the alleged conduct
          subverts the underlying purpose of a judicial proceed-
          ing, in a similar way to how conduct constituting abuse
          of process and vexatious litigation does, and bears little
          resemblance to a defamation claim; (2) Caroline’s
          actions are not the sole basis for the plaintiff’s claims
          against the defendants but, rather, constitute but one
          facet of a broader extrajudicial conspiracy to interfere
          with the sale of the Confirmit shares and to drive down
          the sale price of the shares; (3) the plaintiff’s action is
          not the type of retaliatory action the litigation privilege
          was intended to prevent because it does not seek to
          punish Caroline for statements she made in her actions
          but, rather, for her improper use of the courts to accom-
May 28, 2024             CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                       Page 27

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