Deutsche Bank AG v. Vik, 349 Conn. 120 (2024)

Citation: Deutsche Bank AG v. Vik, 349 Conn. 120 (2024)
Parent Document: Deutsche Bank AG v. Vik, 349 Conn. 120 (2024)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 2024-05-28
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10131755/deutsche-bank-ag-v-vik/ ↗

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the liability of the other tortfeasors’’); 4 Restatement
         (Second), Torts § 880, p. 325 (1979) (‘‘[i]f two persons
         would otherwise be liable for a harm, one of them is
         not relieved from liability by the fact that the other has
         an absolute privilege to act or an immunity from liability
         to the person harmed’’).
            Caroline’s actions are a different matter, but not as
         they relate to Alexander. As with the judicial proceed-
         ings involving Erik, the complaint does not allege that
         Alexander was a party to or participated in Caroline’s
         actions in a manner that would entitle him to absolute
         immunity from claims arising therefrom.8 The com-
         plaint alleges that Alexander operated ‘‘as puppet mas-
         ter’’ in ‘‘setting the stage’’ for the injunctive actions
         brought by Caroline. He did this, according to the com-
         plaint, by forging a document purporting to grant Caro-
         line an irrevocable right of first refusal to purchase
         the Confirmit shares, which Caroline then presented to
         ABG with the aim of disrupting and/or halting the sale
         of the company. When this failed, he directed Caroline
         to commence actions in Connecticut and Norway against
         ABG to enjoin the sale on the basis of the fraudulent
           8
             We note that the complaint alleges that Alexander filed two affidavits
         in the Connecticut District Court action (not the Norway action) describing
         how he ‘‘personally attempted to participate in the Confirmit sales process
         and [stating] that he had contacted ABG so that he could be considered a
         potential buyer in the process.’’ The complaint further alleges that, ‘‘[a]ccord-
         ing to [these] sworn statement[s], [Alexander] was located in Connecticut
         for a ‘substantial portion’ of his interactions with ABG.’’ These affidavits
         have no bearing on our jurisdictional analysis because the plaintiff is not
         seeking to impose liability on Alexander on the basis of any statement he
         made in the affidavits. The allegations relating to the affidavits are set forth
         in the portion of the complaint titled ‘‘Jurisdiction and Venue’’ and are
         included to establish the court’s personal jurisdiction over Alexander based
         on his statement that he was in Connecticut for a substantial portion of the
         time that he interacted with ABG concerning the sale. Although the complaint
         does seek to hold Alexander liable for his interactions with ABG prior to
         Caroline’s actions, in particular his submission of an allegedly dishonest
         bid to purchase the Confirmit shares, as we explained, Alexander’s conduct
         in this regard is not covered by the litigation privilege because it occurred
         entirely outside the context of any judicial proceeding.
Page 26                   CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                 May 28, 2024

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