Deutsche Bank AG v. Vik, 349 Conn. 120 (2024)

Citation: Deutsche Bank AG v. Vik, 349 Conn. 120 (2024)
Parent Document: Deutsche Bank AG v. Vik, 349 Conn. 120 (2024)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 2024-05-28
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10131755/deutsche-bank-ag-v-vik/ ↗

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is centered around the . . . Norway and . . . Con-
       necticut [District Court actions], the appeals that [Erik]
       took in Norway under [Alexander’s] alleged direction
       and decision making, and the submission of allegedly
       manufactured evidence.’’ The defendants further con-
       tend that, although the plaintiff may ‘‘in hindsight . . .
       wish it had alleged a count for abuse of process . . .
       it did not do so. . . . Instead, the plaintiff served a
       complaint containing two counts—tortious interfer-
       ence with business expectancy and a violation of
       CUTPA—both of which are premised on the defendants’
       conduct and communications in prior judicial proceed-
       ings,’’ with nonessential ‘‘allegations of ‘inextricably
       intertwined’ extrajudicial conduct’’ ‘‘sprinkled in
       . . . .’’
                                     I
           Before addressing the merits of the plaintiff’s claims,
       we must resolve the defendants’ contention, made for
       the first time during oral argument before this court,
       that the plaintiff’s appeal was rendered moot by Deutsche
       Bank AG v. Sebastian Holdings, Inc., supra, 346 Conn.
       564. Following argument, we ordered the parties to
       file supplemental briefs addressing this issue. In their
       supplemental brief, the defendants concede that they
       had confused mootness with the doctrine of collateral
       estoppel, or issue preclusion. See, e.g., Wilcox v. Web-
       ster Ins., Inc., 294 Conn. 206, 222, 982 A.2d 1053 (2009)
       (‘‘[I]t appears that the defendant has confused the con-
       cepts of collateral estoppel and mootness. These con-
       cepts are separate and distinct. Collateral estoppel is an
       affirmative defense that may be waived if not properly
       pleaded. . . . Mootness, on the other hand, is a justi-
       ciability doctrine that implicates this court’s subject
       matter jurisdiction . . . and, thus, cannot be waived
       and can be raised at any time.’’ (Citations omitted.)
       However, the defendants persist in claiming that this
       court should decide the appeal on this alternative
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