Deutsche Bank AG v. Vik, 349 Conn. 120 (2024)

Citation: Deutsche Bank AG v. Vik, 349 Conn. 120 (2024)
Parent Document: Deutsche Bank AG v. Vik, 349 Conn. 120 (2024)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 2024-05-28
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10131755/deutsche-bank-ag-v-vik/ ↗

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judgment action; (2) the claims were solely premised
         on conduct, not communications; and (3) the alleged
         fraud did not occur during the pendency of a judicial
         proceeding between [the] parties.’’ (Citations omitted.)
         Dorfman v. Smith, supra, 342 Conn. 604 n.10.
           In Dorfman, we emphasized the importance of the
         third factor, which reflects the litigation privilege’s fun-
         damental purpose of preventing retaliatory civil claims
         against a party opponent based on statements made by
         them in a judicial proceeding between the parties. Id.
         We then distinguished the complaint in Dorfman,
         which, unlike the complaint in Fiondella, clearly alleged
         dishonesty on the part of a party opponent based
         entirely on allegedly false statements made in an action
         between the parties, not on any type of conduct.9 Id.,
         604–605.
            In the present case, in contrast, the plaintiff was not
         a party to Caroline’s actions, and its claims are not
         premised on any statement made in those actions but,
         rather, are premised on conduct (the alleged multifac-
         eted conspiracy) occurring outside of the actions. Like-
         wise, the alleged fraud did not commence during the
         actions but, rather, began months earlier with the
         alleged forgery of the ROFR. In essence, as alleged in
         the complaint, the actions were the defendants’ attempt
         to defraud ABG by other means when their first
         attempt failed.
           In light of the foregoing, we are persuaded that the
         present case is not the type of action the litigation
           9
             Although, in Dorfman, the parties were opponents in the prior action
         that formed the basis of the dispute, the litigation privilege nonetheless may
         insulate a person from liability for statements made in a prior judicial
         proceeding irrespective of whether the party bringing the action was a
         participant in the prior proceeding. See, e.g., Simms v. Seaman, supra, 308
         Conn. 537 (‘‘communications uttered or published in the course of judicial
         proceedings are absolutely privileged so long as they are in some way
         pertinent to the subject of the controversy’’ (internal quotation marks
         omitted)).
Page 30                   CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                 May 28, 2024

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