Deutsche Bank AG v. Vik, 349 Conn. 120 (2024)

Citation: Deutsche Bank AG v. Vik, 349 Conn. 120 (2024)
Parent Document: Deutsche Bank AG v. Vik, 349 Conn. 120 (2024)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 2024-05-28
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10131755/deutsche-bank-ag-v-vik/ ↗

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omitted.) MacDermid, Inc. v. Leonetti, 310 Conn. 616,
       626, 79 A.3d 60 (2013). Whether the litigation privilege
       applies in a given case is a question of law subject to
       de novo review. See, e.g., Dorfman v. Smith, supra,
       594. When deciding whether the privilege applies, every
       presumption in favor of the court’s jurisdiction should
       be indulged. See, e.g., Priore v. Haig, 344 Conn. 636,
       645, 280 A.3d 402 (2022).
          The litigation privilege is ‘‘a long-standing [common-
       law] rule that communications uttered or published
       in the course of judicial proceedings are absolutely
       privileged so long as they are in some way pertinent
       to the subject of the controversy.’’ (Internal quotation
       marks omitted.) Simms v. Seaman, 308 Conn. 523, 537,
       69 A.3d 880 (2013). ‘‘The privilege . . . applies to every
       step of the proceeding until [its] final disposition . . .
       including to statements made in pleadings or other doc-
       uments prepared in connection with [the] proceeding.’’
       (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
       Scholz v. Epstein, 341 Conn. 1, 28–29, 266 A.3d 127
       (2021). The privilege ‘‘originated in response to the need
       to bar persons accused of crimes from suing their accus-
       ers for defamation. . . . [It] then developed to encom-
       pass and bar defamation claims against all participants
       in judicial proceedings, including judges, attorneys, par-
       ties, and witnesses.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quota-
       tion marks omitted.) MacDermid, Inc. v. Leonetti,
       supra, 310 Conn. 627. Subsequently, the privilege was
       expanded to bar a variety of retaliatory civil claims
       arising from communications or communicative acts
       occurring in the course of a judicial or quasi-judicial
       proceeding, including, but not limited to, claims for
       tortious interference, intentional infliction of emotional
       distress, fraud, and violations of CUTPA. See Dorfman
       v. Smith, supra, 342 Conn. 592, 616.
          ‘‘The policy underlying the [litigation] privilege is that
       in certain situations the public interest in having people
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