Section 21-80a

Citation: Section 21-80a
Parent Document: Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 2012-06-26
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2295282/fairchild-heights-inc-v-dickal/ ↗

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In rejecting the proposition that the statute should be given its "literal" meaning; Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 118 Conn.App. 163, 177, 983 A.2d 35 (2009); the Appellate Court had two responses, both of which I consider. First, the Appellate Court agreed that this literal construction was plausible; id., at 174, 983 A.2d 35; but it concluded that it would not strike the proper balance between landlord and tenants' rights, as intended by the legislature. Id., at 177-78, 983 A.2d 35. In so concluding, the Appellate Court relied on the 1976 legislative history relating to the Landlord and Tenant Act; General Statutes § 47a-1 et seq.; reasoning that this act's "broad purpose of balancing the interests of landlords and tenants applies equally to the statutory scheme governing mobile manufactured home site owners and mobile home residents who rent such home sites." Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, supra, at 175, 983 A.2d 35. The Appellate Court overlooks, however, the fact that the legislature unambiguously struck a different balance for mobile park tenants than for other tenants, as is clearly reflected in the different burdens of proof for the defense of retaliatory eviction for the two classes. Compare General Statutes § 47a-33 (providing affirmative defense to tenant when landlord brought eviction action "solely" because tenant attempted to remedy, by lawful means, violation of certain statutes, regulations or ordinances) with General Statutes § 21-80a (a) (prescribing presumption of retaliatory eviction of mobile park tenant when action brought within six months of tenant's engagement in broader class of specified protected activities); see also General Statutes § 21-80a (d) ("[n]othing in this section shall be construed to in any way limit the [retaliatory eviction] defense provided *645 in section 47a-33"). A different balance is justified in part because most mobile park tenants have property interests that other tenants do not. See 34 H.R. Proc., Pt. 22, 1991 Sess., p. 8512, remarks of Representative Douglas C. Mintz (stating when explaining purpose of Public Acts 1991, No. 91-383, which included what was codified as § 21-80a, that "[m]ost mobile home park residents own their homes but rent a space on which the home sits"). Indeed, the legislative history for No. 72-186 of the 1972 Public Acts, which created the first laws governing the licensure and regulation of mobile home parks, reveals the legislature's concern about mobile park owners' abuse of tenants' rights and the fact that mobile park tenants largely are comprised of a more vulnerable population than the general tenant population, such as the elderly and low income families. See 15 H.R. Proc., Pt. 4, 1972 Sess., pp. 1704, 1707-1709; 15 S. Proc., Pt. 5, 1972 Sess., pp.2068-2069.

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