Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)

Citation: Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
Parent Document: Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 2012-06-26
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2295282/fairchild-heights-inc-v-dickal/ ↗

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The majority properly recognizes that the Appellate Court's construction would render the protection under § 21-80a (a) meaningless because proof that a mobile park tenant who owns his or her home has *639 violated a "material term" of the lease is a lesser standard of proof than that required to evict such a tenant under the usual eviction process, which generally requires "material noncompliance" with the lease or certain laws. See footnote 3 of this dissenting opinion. Thus, the majority properly concludes that § 21-80a (b) must limit the circumstances under which an eviction may be pursued, despite the tenant's engagement in protected activities, to a smaller subset of activities than the universe of material noncompliance. Where the majority and I part company is in determining what constitutes that more limited universe.

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