Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)

Citation: Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
Parent Document: Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 2012-06-26
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2295282/fairchild-heights-inc-v-dickal/ ↗

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I fully agree with the majority that the Appellate Court misconstrued General Statutes § 21-80a (b)(1), which provides an exception to the statutory bar to an eviction action commenced within six months of a mobile park tenant engaging in specified protected activities upon proof that the tenant is "using the dwelling unit or the premises ... for a purpose which is in violation of the rental agreement," to mean simply that the tenant has violated a material provision of the rental agreement. I disagree, however, with the majority's alternate basis for affirming the Appellate Court's judgment, under which the majority construes this statutory exception to permit eviction when the tenant has materially violated a lease provision that regulates the use of the dwelling unit or premises, such that the conduct could affect the safety or welfare of other tenants, and determines that this standard was met in the present case. In my view, the majority's *638 construction not only is unsupported by the text of § 21-80a[1] and related provisions of landlord tenant law, it undermines the remedial purpose of the statute. Moreover, there is neither a finding by the trial court to support a conclusion that this newly articulated standard has been met nor facts in the record to support such a conclusion. Construing the exception consistent with the text, I would conclude that the plaintiff, Fairchild Heights, Inc., has not demonstrated that the conduct of the defendants, Nancy Dickal, Alan Dickal and Lisa Dickal, in parking more than two vehicles on the premises, constitutes use for a purpose in violation of the parties' rental agreement that would overcome the presumption of retaliatory eviction. I further would conclude that the trial court improperly determined that, because the present action was part of a "continuing effort" by the plaintiff to resolve a violation of the rental agreement that predated the defendants' protected activities,[2] the defendants could not prevail on a claim of retaliatory eviction under § 21-80a. Accordingly, I would reverse the Appellate Court's judgment. I

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