Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)

Citation: Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
Parent Document: Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
Jurisdiction: Connecticut (state)
Effective Date: 2012-06-26
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2295282/fairchild-heights-inc-v-dickal/ ↗

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More fundamentally, it is difficult to ascertain any meaningful difference between the effect of the Appellate Court's interpretation, which the majority acknowledges is inconsistent with the purpose of § 21-80a, and the majority's initial interpretation. Specifically, the majority's interpretation of § 21-80a (b)(1) would protect from retaliatory eviction only those tenants who had not materially violated a provision in their lease or those who had materially violated a lease provision but in a manner that did not involve the use of either their dwelling unit or their premises. The first group of tenants would not be subject to eviction in any event, because the conduct would not meet the material noncompliance standard required to bring an eviction action generally.[4] See footnote 3 of this dissenting opinion. The second group would encompass so few tenants due to the limited violative conduct as to render the statutory protection essentially meaningless.[5] Simply put, it is not rational to assume that the legislature intended such a limited effect with respect to this remedial scheme.

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