Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Citation
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Parent Document
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Jurisdiction
- Connecticut (state)
- Effective Date
- 2012-06-26
Other Sections in This Document (97)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Section 21-80a
- Section 21-80a
- Section 21-80a
- Section 21-80a
- Section 21-80a
- Section 21-80a
- Section 21-80a
- Section 21-80a
- Section 21-80a
- Section 21-80a
- Section 21-80a
- Section 21-80a
- Section 21-80a
- Section 21-80a
- Section 21-80a
- Section 21-80a
- Section 21-80a
- Section 21-80a
- Section 21-80a
- Section 21-80a
- Section 21-80a
- Section 21-80a
- Section 21-80a
- Section 21-80a
- Section 21-80a
- Section 21-80a
- Section 21-80a
- Section 21-80a
- Section 21-80a
- Section 21-80a
- Section 21-80a
- Section 21-80a
- Section 21-80a
- Section 21-80a
- Section 21-80a
- Section 21-80a
- Section 21-80a
- Section 21-80a
- Section 21-80a
- Section 21-80a
- Section 21-80a
- Section 21-80a
- Section 21-80a
- Section 21-80a
- Section 21-80a
- Section 21-80a
- Section 21-80a
- Section 21-80a
- Section 21-80a
- Section 21-80a
- Section 21-80a
- Section 21-80a
- Section 21-80a
- Section 21-80a
- Section 21-80a
Full Text
1,018 charsThe majority mistakenly relies on the following statement by the trial court as a finding that demonstrates that its newly articulated standard has been met: "Excess vehicles are commonly parked on common property or impinge upon the roads throughout the park, making snow removal and maintenance difficult." There are several problems with this reliance. First, it is apparent from the context of this statement that the trial court was addressing the defendants' claim that the plaintiff's two vehicle rule was unreasonable.[12] Second, neither the statement itself nor the testimony cited in support of this statement addresses the defendants' conduct. Even if one were to infer that *643 the common practice referred to by the trial court includes conduct by the defendants, there is nothing to indicate whether they materially contributed to this problem. Therefore, in my view, the majority not only has misconstrued § 21-80a (b)(1), but it also improperly has determined that its standard has been satisfied. II