Section 21-80a
- Citation
- Section 21-80a
- Parent Document
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Jurisdiction
- Connecticut (state)
- Effective Date
- 2012-06-26
Other Sections in This Document (97)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
- Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (2012)
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Full Text
1,946 charsSection 21-80a (b)(1) permits a mobile home park owner to overcome the presumption that it is evicting a mobile park tenant for engaging in activities protected under subsection (a) of that statute by demonstrating, inter alia, that "[t]he resident is using the dwelling unit or the premises for an illegal purpose or for a purpose which is in violation of the rental agreement or for nonpayment of rent...." (Emphasis added.) As we previously have discussed, the common meaning of "purpose" is "something set up as an object or end to be attained...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Thus, the ultimate object toward which use of the property is directed must be fundamentally contrary to the set of ultimate objects that the rental agreement contemplates. In essence, the question of whether there is a use for a "purpose" in violation of the rental agreement is a question of contract interpretation in which we seek to ascertain the intention of the parties. See 19 Perry Street, LLC v. Unionville Water Co., 294 Conn. 611, 622-23, 987 A.2d 1009 (2010) ("[A] lease is a contract, and, therefore, it is subject to the same rules of construction as other contracts.... Ordinarily the parties' intent is a question of fact.... Where a party's intent is expressed clearly and unambiguously in writing, however, the determination of what the parties intended ... is a question of law [over which our review is plenary]." [Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.]). Where the contract does not expressly set forth the scope of permissible ends, as a matter of basic contract interpretation we look to the rental agreement as a whole to ascertain the parties' purpose in making that agreement. As in other circumstances in which this court has articulated the purpose of various types of contracts, we look not only to specific terms but also to the overarching end intended to be achieved by the collective force of those terms.[13]