Section 7

Citation: Section 7
Parent Document: Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S. 644 (2020)
Jurisdiction: United States (federal)
Effective Date: 2020-06-15
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4760997/bostock-v-clayton-county/ ↗

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So it is here. As demonstrated by all of the statutes cov-
ering sexual orientation discrimination, Congress knows
how to prohibit sexual orientation discrimination. So
courts should not read that specific concept into the general
words “discriminate because of sex.” We cannot close our
eyes to the indisputable fact that Congress—for several dec-
ades in a large number of statutes—has identified sex dis-
crimination and sexual orientation discrimination as two
distinct categories.
   Where possible, we also strive to interpret statutes so as
not to create undue surplusage. It is not uncommon to find
some scattered redundancies in statutes. But reading sex
discrimination to encompass sexual orientation discrimina-
tion would cast aside as surplusage the numerous refer-
ences to sexual orientation discrimination sprinkled
throughout the U. S. Code in laws enacted over the last 25
years.
   In short, an extensive body of federal law both reflects
and reinforces the widespread understanding that sexual
orientation discrimination is distinct from, and not a form
of, sex discrimination.
   The story is the same with bills proposed in Congress.
Since the 1970s, Members of Congress have introduced
many bills to prohibit sexual orientation discrimination in
the workplace. Until very recently, all of those bills would
have expressly established sexual orientation as a sepa-
rately proscribed category of discrimination. The bills did
not define sex discrimination to encompass sexual orienta-
tion discrimination.6
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    6 See, e.g., H. R. 14752, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., §§6, 11 (1974) (amending

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