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Section 7

Citation
Section 7
Parent Document
Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S. 644 (2020)
Effective Date
2020-06-15
Original Source
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4760997/bostock-v-clayton-county/ ↗

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There is no serious debate about the foundational interpretive principle that courts adhere to ordinary meaning, not literal meaning, when interpreting statutes. As Justice Scalia explained, "the good textualist is not a literalist." A. Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation 24 (1997). Or as Professor Eskridge stated: The "prime directive in statutory interpretation is to apply the meaning that a reasonable reader would derive from the text of the law," so that "for hard cases as well as easy ones, the ordinary meaning (or the 'everyday meaning' or the 'commonsense' reading) of the relevant statutory text is the anchor for statutory interpretation." W. Eskridge, Interpreting Law 33, 34-35 (2016) (footnote omitted). Or as Professor Manning put it, proper statutory interpretation asks "how a reasonable person, conversant with the relevant social and linguistic conventions, would read the text in context. This approach recognizes that the literal or dictionary definitions of words will often fail to account for settled nuances or background conventions that qualify the literal meaning of language and, in particular, of legal language." Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 2387, 2392-2393 (2003). Or as Professor Nelson wrote: No "mainstream judge is interested solely in the literal definitions of a statute's words." Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 Va. L. Rev. 347, 376 (2005). The ordinary meaning that counts is the ordinary public meaning at the time of enactment-although in this case, that temporal principle matters little because the ordinary meaning of "discriminate because of sex" was the same in 1964 as it is now.