Section 7

Citation: Section 7
Parent Document: Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S. 644 (2020)
Jurisdiction: United States (federal)
Effective Date: 2020-06-15
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4760997/bostock-v-clayton-county/ ↗

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held it was immaterial that members of the same sex as the
victim committed the alleged discrimination. Nor did the
Court concern itself with whether men as a group were sub-
ject to discrimination or whether something in addition to
sex contributed to the discrimination, like the plaintiff ’s
conduct or personal attributes. “[A]ssuredly,” the case
didn’t involve “the principal evil Congress was concerned
with when it enacted Title VII.” Id., at 79. But, the Court
unanimously explained, it is “the provisions of our laws ra-
ther than the principal concerns of our legislators by which
we are governed.” Ibid. Because the plaintiff alleged that
the harassment would not have taken place but for his
sex—that is, the plaintiff would not have suffered similar
treatment if he were female—a triable Title VII claim ex-
isted.
   The lessons these cases hold for ours are by now familiar.
   First, it’s irrelevant what an employer might call its dis-
criminatory practice, how others might label it, or what else
might motivate it. In Manhart, the employer called its rule
requiring women to pay more into the pension fund a “life
expectancy” adjustment necessary to achieve sex equality.
In Phillips, the employer could have accurately spoken of
its policy as one based on “motherhood.” In much the same
way, today’s employers might describe their actions as mo-
tivated by their employees’ homosexuality or transgender
status. But just as labels and additional intentions or mo-
tivations didn’t make a difference in Manhart or Phillips,
they cannot make a difference here. When an employer
fires an employee for being homosexual or transgender, it
necessarily and intentionally discriminates against that in-
dividual in part because of sex. And that is all Title VII has
ever demanded to establish liability.
   Second, the plaintiff ’s sex need not be the sole or primary
cause of the employer’s adverse action. In Phillips, Man-
hart, and Oncale, the defendant easily could have pointed
to some other, nonprotected trait and insisted it was the
                 Cite as: 590 U. S. ____ (2020)           15 Opinion of the Court

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