Section 7

Citation: Section 7
Parent Document: Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S. 644 (2020)
Jurisdiction: United States (federal)
Effective Date: 2020-06-15
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4760997/bostock-v-clayton-county/ ↗

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that an employer could refuse to hire a gay or transgender individual
    without learning that person’s sex. By intentionally setting out a rule
    that makes hiring turn on sex, the employer violates the law, whatever
    he might know or not know about individual applicants. The employ-
    ers also stress that homosexuality and transgender status are distinct
    concepts from sex, and that if Congress wanted to address these mat-
    ters in Title VII, it would have referenced them specifically. But when
    Congress chooses not to include any exceptions to a broad rule, this
    Court applies the broad rule. Finally, the employers suggest that be-
    cause the policies at issue have the same adverse consequences for
    men and women, a stricter causation test should apply. That argu-
    ment unavoidably comes down to a suggestion that sex must be the
    sole or primary cause of an adverse employment action under Title VII,
    a suggestion at odds with the statute. Pp. 16–23.
          (2) The employers contend that few in 1964 would have expected
    Title VII to apply to discrimination against homosexual and
    transgender persons. But legislative history has no bearing here,
    where no ambiguity exists about how Title VII’s terms apply to the
    facts. See Milner v. Department of Navy, 562 U. S. 562, 574. While it
    is possible that a statutory term that means one thing today or in one
    context might have meant something else at the time of its adoption
    or might mean something different in another context, the employers
    do not seek to use historical sources to illustrate that the meaning of
    any of Title VII’s language has changed since 1964 or that the statute’s
    terms ordinarily carried some missed message. Instead, they seem to
    say when a new application is both unexpected and important, even if
    it is clearly commanded by existing law, the Court should merely point
    out the question, refer the subject back to Congress, and decline to en-
    force the law’s plain terms in the meantime. This Court has long re-
    jected that sort of reasoning. And the employers’ new framing may
    only add new problems and leave the Court with more than a little law
    to overturn. Finally, the employers turn to naked policy appeals, sug-
    gesting that the Court proceed without the law’s guidance to do what
    it thinks best. That is an invitation that no court should ever take up.
    Pp. 23–33.
No. 17–1618, 723 Fed. Appx. 964, reversed and remanded; No. 17–1623,
 883 F. 3d 100, and No. 18–107, 884 F. 3d 560, affirmed.

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