Section 7

Citation: Section 7
Parent Document: Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S. 644 (2020)
Jurisdiction: United States (federal)
Effective Date: 2020-06-15
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4760997/bostock-v-clayton-county/ ↗

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That longstanding and widespread congressional prac-
tice matters. When interpreting statutes, as the Court has
often said, we “usually presume differences in language”
convey “differences in meaning.” Wisconsin Central, 585
U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 4) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). When Congress chooses distinct phrases to accom-
plish distinct purposes, and does so over and over again for
decades, we may not lightly toss aside all of Congress’s care-
ful handiwork. As Justice Scalia explained for the Court,
“it is not our function” to “treat alike subjects that different
Congresses have chosen to treat differently.” West Virginia
Univ. Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 499 U. S. 83, 101 (1991); see
id., at 92.
   And the Court has likewise stressed that we may not read
“a specific concept into general words when precise lan-
guage in other statutes reveals that Congress knew how to
identify that concept.” Eskridge, Interpreting Law, at 415;
see University of Tex. Southwestern Medical Center v. Nas-
sar, 570 U. S. 338, 357 (2013); Arlington Central School
Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Murphy, 548 U. S. 291, 297–298 (2006);
Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 543 U. S.
335, 341–342 (2005); Custis v. United States, 511 U. S. 485,
491–493 (1994); West Virginia Univ. Hospitals, 499 U. S.,
at 99.
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(identifying violence motivated by “gender, sexual orientation” as na-
tional problem); §30503(a)(1)(C) (authorizing Attorney General to assist
state, local, and tribal investigations of crimes motivated by the victim’s
“gender, sexual orientation”); §§41305(b)(1), (3) (requiring Attorney Gen-
eral to acquire data on crimes motivated by “gender . . . , sexual orienta-
tion,” but disclaiming any cause of action including one “based on dis-
crimination due to sexual orientation”); 42 U. S. C. §294e–1(b)(2)
(conditioning funding on institution’s inclusion of persons of “different
genders and sexual orientations”); see also United States Sentencing
Commission, Guidelines Manual §3A1.1(a) (Nov. 2018) (authorizing in-
creased offense level if the crime was motivated by the victim’s “gender
. . . or sexual orientation”); 2E Guide to Judiciary Policy §320 (2019) (pro-
hibiting judicial discrimination because of “sex, . . . sexual orientation”).
                      Cite as: 590 U. S. ____ (2020)                      15 KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting

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