Section 205
- Citation
- Section 205
- Parent Document
- Cole v. Harris, 187 U.S. App. D.C. 156 (1977)
- Jurisdiction
- United States (federal)
- Effective Date
- 1977-11-14
- Original Source
- https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/7891523/cole-v-harris/ ↗
Other Sections in This Document (158)
- Cole v. Harris, 187 U.S. App. D.C. 156 (1977)
- Cole v. Harris, 187 U.S. App. D.C. 156 (1977)
- Cole v. Harris, 187 U.S. App. D.C. 156 (1977)
- Cole v. Harris, 187 U.S. App. D.C. 156 (1977)
- Cole v. Harris, 187 U.S. App. D.C. 156 (1977)
- Cole v. Harris, 187 U.S. App. D.C. 156 (1977)
- Cole v. Harris, 187 U.S. App. D.C. 156 (1977)
- Cole v. Harris, 187 U.S. App. D.C. 156 (1977)
- Cole v. Harris, 187 U.S. App. D.C. 156 (1977)
- Cole v. Harris, 187 U.S. App. D.C. 156 (1977)
- Cole v. Harris, 187 U.S. App. D.C. 156 (1977)
- Cole v. Harris, 187 U.S. App. D.C. 156 (1977)
- Cole v. Harris, 187 U.S. App. D.C. 156 (1977)
- Cole v. Harris, 187 U.S. App. D.C. 156 (1977)
- Cole v. Harris, 187 U.S. App. D.C. 156 (1977)
- Cole v. Harris, 187 U.S. App. D.C. 156 (1977)
- Cole v. Harris, 187 U.S. App. D.C. 156 (1977)
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Full Text
1,168 charsIn summary, I agree with the Second Circuit in Caramico v. HUD, with the Eighth Circuit in Harris v. Lynn, and with the Seventh Circuit in Alexander v. HUD. All three of our sister circuits have held that where there is an in voluntary acquisition of property by HUD the evicted tenants are not “displaced persons” within the meaning of the Act. My colleagues have tried valiantly to distinguish Caramico by saying it clearly turned upon the “acquisition” clause defining “displaced persons,” but the Eighth Circuit in Harris v. Lynn and the Seventh Circuit in Alexander v. HUD dealt with the “notice” clause definition of displaced persons, which is involved in our case. In each instance the Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed a District Court reaching the decision I would reach here. In light of the analysis of the statute in these three cases by twelve federal judges, and the unanimous conclusion reached in each case, I respectfully suggest that the reasons advanced by my two colleagues here are unpersuasive, certainly inadequate to overcome the weight of both reason and authority manifested in the other three circuits. I therefore respectfully dissent.