Section 205

Citation: Section 205
Parent Document: Cole v. Harris, 187 U.S. App. D.C. 156 (1977)
Jurisdiction: United States (federal)
Effective Date: 1977-11-14
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/7891523/cole-v-harris/ ↗

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This was exactly what the Seventh Circuit held in Alexander v. HUD, supra. The court’s description of plaintiffs’ argument in Alexander neatly describes plaintiffs’ argument here: “The tenants in this case *177contend that Caramico is distinguishable factually since in Caramico HUD was not the mortgagee, did not foreclose on the mortgage, and did not purchase the property from which the tenants were evicted. Further, plaintiffs argue Caramico involved the acquisition aspect of 42 U.S.C. § 4601(6), whereas here plaintiffs rely on the aspect of that section dealing with a written order to vacate by the acquiring agency.”46 The Seventh Circuit squarely and unanimously rejected this argument, the position of my two colleagues here, saying: “Although distinguishable with respect to particular facts, Caramico involved the same inquiry as presented by this case, i. e., whether the activity of the. governmental agency was ‘for a program or project undertaken by a Federal agency, or with Federal financial assistance.’ In this case, we conclude that HUD’s written order to the tenants of Riverhouse to vacate by December 31,1974 was not for such a program or project.”47 No legal legerdemain can distinguish the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Alexander from the case at bar.48 IV. OVERALL PURPOSE OF THE ACT

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