Section 4625

Citation: Section 4625
Parent Document: Cole v. Harris, 187 U.S. App. D.C. 156 (1977)
Jurisdiction: United States (federal)
Effective Date: 1977-11-14
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/7891523/cole-v-harris/ ↗

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First, the government argues that this restriction is required by Caramico v. Secretary of Dept. of Housing and Urban Development, 509 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1974), which held that “random and involuntary” acquisitions of property due to default and foreclosure are not acquisitions for a federal program or project.28 As the government concedes, Caramico was concerned solely with the acquisition definition, rather than the one upon which the Sky Tower tenants rely; the notice definition.29 But it finds significance in the phrase “acquiring agency” contained in the notice definition. Invoking the principle that the same word used in different parts of a statute is presumed to have the same meaning each time it is used,30 it argues that “acquiring agency” should be interpreted to mean an agency making an “acquisition” as that term was construed by Caramico. In other words, that the notice definition, like the acquisition definition, should not apply where property is acquired due to default and foreclosure and only later is committed to use in a federal program or project.

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