Section 4625
- Citation
- Section 4625
- Parent Document
- Cole v. Harris, 187 U.S. App. D.C. 156 (1977)
- Jurisdiction
- United States (federal)
- Effective Date
- 1977-11-14
- Original Source
- https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/7891523/cole-v-harris/ ↗
Other Sections in This Document (158)
- Cole v. Harris, 187 U.S. App. D.C. 156 (1977)
- Cole v. Harris, 187 U.S. App. D.C. 156 (1977)
- Cole v. Harris, 187 U.S. App. D.C. 156 (1977)
- Cole v. Harris, 187 U.S. App. D.C. 156 (1977)
- Cole v. Harris, 187 U.S. App. D.C. 156 (1977)
- Cole v. Harris, 187 U.S. App. D.C. 156 (1977)
- Cole v. Harris, 187 U.S. App. D.C. 156 (1977)
- Cole v. Harris, 187 U.S. App. D.C. 156 (1977)
- Cole v. Harris, 187 U.S. App. D.C. 156 (1977)
- Cole v. Harris, 187 U.S. App. D.C. 156 (1977)
- Cole v. Harris, 187 U.S. App. D.C. 156 (1977)
- Cole v. Harris, 187 U.S. App. D.C. 156 (1977)
- Cole v. Harris, 187 U.S. App. D.C. 156 (1977)
- Cole v. Harris, 187 U.S. App. D.C. 156 (1977)
- Cole v. Harris, 187 U.S. App. D.C. 156 (1977)
- Cole v. Harris, 187 U.S. App. D.C. 156 (1977)
- Cole v. Harris, 187 U.S. App. D.C. 156 (1977)
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Full Text
1,053 charsThe Seventh Circuit unanimously affirmed, pointing out that “[eligibility for URA benefits is also based on the requirement that a person be displaced ‘for a program or project undertaken by a federal agency, or with federal financial assistance.’ 42 U.S.C. § 4601(6). This requirement has been interpreted to mean construction of new federal projects.”22 The Seventh Circuit then discussed Caramico at some length, and emphasized the significance of the Second Circuit’s “[fjinding a crucial difference between mortgage insurance acquisitions and acquisitions under programs covered by URA.”23 The difference, according to the Seventh Circuit, was that “the Second Circuit characterized the former as ‘random and involuntary while normal urban renewal contemplates a conscious government decision to dislocate some so that an entire area may benefit.’ ”24 The Seventh Circuit thus agreed completely with the Second Circuit in holding that involuntary mortgage foreclosure acquisitions were not within the “programs or projects” contemplated by the Act.